












Standard interpretations1 of Hume’s account of imagination are drawn from Book I of the 
Treatise. Thus, the role of imagination in Hume’s philosophy tends to be understood within the 
context of relevant topics discussed in Book I; namely, epistemology, metaphysics, and 
philosophy of mind. Broadly construed, this interpretation views imagination as an “idea-
forming faculty”2 responsible for forming, uniting, and separating ideas.3 In Books II and III, 
however, Hume frequently invokes the imagination in his moral philosophy; for example, in 
discussions concerning conventions of justice, the mechanics of sympathy, and how we come to 
experience certain passions. For the most part, commentators have neglected Hume’s references 
to imagination throughout Book II and III in constructing their interpretations of this faculty; 
presumably because they assume that Hume is no longer developing his view after Book I. 
However, a number of passages in Book II and III cast doubt on the adequacy of the standard 
interpretation in explaining certain functions of the imagination in Hume’s moral philosophy. 
                                                
1 Commentators who I think develop the standard interpretation include: Wilbanks, Jan. Hume's Theory of 
Imagination. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968; Pears, David. Hume's System. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990; Costelloe, Timothy M. "Hume's Phenomenology of the Imagination." The Journal of 
ScottishPhilosophy, 2007: 31 – 45; Streminger, Gerhard. "Hume's Theory of Imagination." Hume Studies, 1980: 91 
– 118; and Traiger, Saul. "Hume on Memory and Imagination." In A Companion to Hume, edited by Elizabeth S. 
Radcliffe, 58 - 71. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 200 
2 Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy, 26. 
3 Wilbanks, Hume’s Theory of Imagination, 72. 
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 There are a number of interpretive tasks involved in understanding the role of 
imagination in the latter books of the Treatise, but in this paper I will focus on the central reason 
the standard interpretation is incomplete. In his account of sympathy, Hume appears to extend 
the mental entities that the imagination can operate on (ideas) to impressions as well. If this is 
correct, it follows that the standard interpretation is inadequate in accounting for the operations 
of imagination in Books II and III. Moreover, including impressions among the “materials of 
imagination”4 raises problems that require reinterpreting this vital faculty and how it fits into the 
overall project of the Treatise.  
In Section 2, I provide an account of the standard interpretation. In Section 3, I raise 
problematic passages from Book II and III that the standard interpretation cannot account for. In 
Section 4, I argue that to explain these passages we must assign an additional function to the 
imagination, what some commentators have construed as Hume’s theory of moral imagination, 
but what I shall identify as the ‘transformative function’ of the imagination. Also, I try to 
reconcile this new function with the standard interpretation. In Section 5 I make my concluding 
remarks, and identify some important problems that my interpretation raises.  
2. The Standard Interpretation 
 In this section, I draw from a number of commentators to construct what I am calling the 
‘standard interpretation’ of imagination. I do not mean to suggest that there aren’t significant 
differences between these interpretations. In some cases I will note these differences, but what 
makes the interpretations “standard” are the following two features: 1) limiting the objects of 
imagination to ideas, and 2) restricting attention to Book I. I will not dispute the standard 
interpretation insofar as it concerns Book I. In fact, for the most part I agree with it. Also, in 
cases where commentators disagree or fail to attend to some aspect of Hume’s account, I will try 
                                                
4 Wilbanks, Hume’s Theory of Imagination, 63. 
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to reconcile the views in a consistent way that will equip the standard interpretation with 
maximum explanatory power.  
 Throughout Book I, Hume is very cautious about positing metaphysically distinct 
faculties of the mind. Recall Hume’s claim that there is a fallacious distinction between power 
and the exercise of it,5 and this critique of ancient philosophers: “they need only say, that any 
phaenomenon, which puzzles them, arises from a faculty or occult quality, and there is an end of 
all dispute and enquiry upon the matter.”6 It is safe to say, however, that Hume views the 
imagination as a distinct mental faculty.7 But it is not apparent what a faculty is for Hume. I 
won’t delve into this issue because it is beyond the scope of this paper, and I don’t think that 
getting clear on the nature of mental faculties is imperative for the project at hand. As David 
Owen points out, “the important point is not which faculty an activity occurs in, but the general 
principles which explain that activity.”8 Nevertheless, I will provide the following definition in 
order to provide some grounding for the term: a ‘faculty’ is an original (as opposed to an 
acquired) capability of the mind that directs, makes possible, or organizes some type(s) of 
experience. 
 Commentators identify different functions of the imagination, that is, various things that 
the imagination can do.9 There isn’t consensus among commentators about how many functions 
the imagination has; this is for various reasons, e.g. a commentator will conflate two functions 
                                                
5 T 171. 
6 T 224. 
7 For textual evidence see: T 8; T 10; and T 339. Most commentators argue or assume that Hume believed in robust 
mental faculties. For example: Wilbanks, Hume's Theory of Imagination, 72; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment,  
21; Costelloe, Timothy M. "Hume's Phenomenology of the Imagination," 31; Streminger, "Hume's Theory of 
Imagination," 91.  
8 Owen, Hume’s Reason, 66 (footnote). 
9 I am borrowing the term ‘function’ from Streminger. These functions are also known in the literature as “powers,” 
“faculties,” “activities,” etc. This terminology is arbitrary and I don’t think that choosing to use any one of them 
carries significant philosophical ramifications (Perhaps Costelloe’s use of ‘power’ could be misleading given that 




into one. I have gleaned the following four distinct functions of the imagination from the 
literature: the imagistic function, the conceptual function, the scientific function, and the 
metaphysical function.10 I will address each, in turn.  
2.1 The Imagistic Function 
 The imagistic function is responsible for creating copies of impressions,11 that is, ideas.12 
The imagination, however, is not the only faculty that can do this. The faculty of memory also 
creates ideas by copying impressions, but the ideas it produces are different than those of 
imagination. Essentially, when memory copies an impression, it conserves a considerable 
amount of the force and vivacity of the impression, and it also “preserves the original form” in 
which the impression appeared in the mind.13 In contrast, the imagistic function provides ideas 
that are “faint and languid,” which are not “restrain’d to the same order and form with the 
original impressions.”14 Note that for Hume, the imagistic function (as well as memory) is 
passive and involuntary; the mind automatically produces an idea that corresponds to every 
impression it receives (assuming one’s faculties are not defective).  
 The identification and distinction between these two stocks of ideas is crucial for Hume’s 
epistemology. As Timothy Costelloe points out, 
memory connects directly to experience by recalling the past, whereas imagination does so 
indirectly by anticipating the future; as a result, memory preserves experience, while imagination 
subverts it. The indirect relation that imagination bears to experience, moreover, is at once a 
weakness and strength: its ideas lack force and vivacity and fail to repeat impressions, but this also 
liberates the imagination from matters of fact to which the memory is tied.15 
 
                                                
10 The terms ‘imagistic’ and ‘conceptual’ are borrowed from Costelloe, and the terms ‘scientific’ and ‘metaphysical’ 
are borrowed from Streminger.  
11 Note that copying impressions does not qualify as the imagination operating on impressions. 
12 For now, I am assuming a basic understanding of the impression/idea distinction. Later, the distinction is 
examined closely. 
13 T 9. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Costelloe, “Hume’s Phenomenology of the Imagination,” 33. 
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Ideas of memory present themselves to the mind in a fixed manner, and are are not candidates for 
alteration.16 Hume requires ideas that are not constrained in order to account for the synthesis of 
ideas (performed by the conceptual function, considered next), which the imagistic function 
provides. If Hume failed to distinguish between these two types of ideas, then every idea could 
be altered by the imagination and the reliability of memory would be compromised, which would 
have severe epistemological consequences.17  
2.2 The Conceptual Function 
 Described by Hume as “creative,” the conceptual function is responsible for 
“compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded to us by the 
senses and experience.”18 There are three ways that the conceptual function can synthesize ideas 
(That is, from the present stock of ideas) to create new ones. 1) By composition it can unite 
simple or complex ideas together to form a new complex idea, e.g. a gold mountain. 2) By 
transposition it can alter features of ideas, e.g. switching the colors of the inside and the outside 
of an apple. 3) By augmentation it can increase features of an idea, e.g. make a person taller. In 
regards to separating ideas, this is done by “diminishing” or dividing a complex idea into its 
constituent simple ideas.  
                                                
16 Hume’s claim that ideas of memory preserve the order of our impressions and are rigid and constrained is useful 
for him epistemologically, because it connects these ideas with experience, and serves as the basis for custom and 
habit, that is, causation. However, there are many counterexamples to this theory. Our memory is constantly affected 
and sometimes significantly altered by various factors. With that said, I think that Hume intends his distinction 
between memory and imagination to only be descriptive (not normative). As I understand the text, Hume doesn’t 
extensively attend to clear cases of faulty memory. However, this does not mean that he cannot account for it, or that 
his theory is compromised by not accounting for these problematic cases. Taking the naturalistic interpretation, I 
think that Hume would say that for the most part his theory does allow for us to reliably distinguish between and 
identify ideas of memory and imagination, and that that is sufficient for us to employ the distinction in this way 
despite the inability of the theory to account for some counterexamples. 
17 As A.J. Ayer puts it, Hume “puts the data of memory very much on a level with the immediate data of sense-
perception, as sources of knowledge which serve as a basis for more venturesome inferences.” See Ayer, Hume, 29. 
18 Enquiry I (Hendel Edition), 27 (Section II, Par. 5) 
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2.3 The Scientific Function19 
 Although Hume describes the conceptual function of the imagination as the most free and 
unbound feature of the human mind, Hume observes that it must have limits: 
nothing wou’d be more unaccountable than the operations of that faculty [imagination], were it not 
guided by some universal principles, which render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all 
times and places. Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou’d join them.20  
 
Hume identifies the principles of association (resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect) as 
the guides of imagination. According to Gerhard Streminger, these principles constitute the 
scientific function of the imagination, which is responsible for structuring the minds “stream of 
perceptions.”21 These principles of association are present in all cognitive activity involving 
ideas of the imagination; they allow our thoughts to be consistently uniform, ordered, and 
ultimately intelligible.22 Moreover, the scientific function of the imagination makes science 
possible because by the relationship of cause and effect we are able to “go beyond a simple 
statement of the given.”23 
2.4 The Metaphysical Function 
 For the most part, the ideas of imagination are supplied by the imagistic and conceptual 
functions. However, Hume acknowledges that we do possess ideas that that are not linked to 
impressions or conceptual synthesis; e.g. personal identity, external objects, and vacuums. These 
ideas arise directly from the metaphysical function, the “ability of the imagination to construct 
concepts (propositions, objects, systems) transcending the empirical realm.”24 Jan Wilbanks 
describes the metaphysical function as the ability of the imagination to suppose the existence of 
                                                
19 Most scholars do not identify the principles of association as a distinct function of the imagination. Streminger is 
the only commentator who does this, and I think that it’s correct to regard it in this way given Hume’s claim that 
these principles are “in the imagination” (T 12). 
20 T 10. 
21 Streminger, “Hume’s Theory of Imagination,” 98. 
22 Strictly speaking, only the principle of causation can be “scientific,” not resemblance and contiguity.  
23 Ibid., 97. 
24 Ibid., 94. 
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an “unknown something.”25 Costelloe notes that although these ideas are fictitious and 
erroneous, they are still necessary in that “they are meaningful and, without positing the objects 
to which they refer, experience would become incoherent.”26 That is, despite being able to 
recognize that we can never come to know an external reality, a true notion of personal identity, 
etc., it is necessary that we maintain our ideas of these “unknown somethings” to not only sustain 
our sanity, but to also function in society. Thus, while the scientific function structures our 
perceptions, the metaphysical function allows for the possibility of these perceptions.27 
3. Problematic Passages 
 Broadly construed, the subjects of Books II and III of the Treatise are psychology, ethics, 
and political philosophy (Like Hume, from hereon I will refer to these fields as ‘moral 
philosophy’). Hume frequently invokes the faculty of imagination in his moral philosophy; in 
fact, the terms ‘imagination’ (as well as ‘fancy’) appear more often in Books II and III of the 
Treatise than in Book I.           
 We cannot consider each appearance of imagination in the latter books; moreover, recall 
that my suggestion is not that every time Hume employs the term ‘imagination’ in the latter 
books that he is using it in a completely different way that in Book I. Instead, what we will focus 
on are problematic passages that do suggest that Hume is using the term differently. In particular, 
passages that concern the role of imagination in the mechanics of sympathy.    
                                                
25 Wilbanks, Hume’s Theory of Imagination, 81. 
26 Costelloe, “Hume’s Phenomenology of the Imagination,” 38. 
27 Commentators use this Kantian terminology to describe the imagination, but I don’t think that the metaphysical 
function should be read too strongly in this way. On my reading, the metaphysical function allows for the possibility 
of experience by allowing for nature to restore a person’s ability to enter the world after being struck with deep 
skepticism (See the Conclusion of Book I). However, there are stronger Kantian readings of the imagination. 
According to Henry H. Price, Hume did anticipate Kant’s theory of Transcendental Imagination, what makes our 
experience of “consciousness of nature, or of the Phenomenal World” possible. However, Price points out that 
Hume failed to distinguish between the Transcendental Imagination and the Empirical Imagination, which is why 
Hume frequently confuses “psychological and epistemological questions.” I am not sure what to make of this. It’s a 
very interesting issue that deserves further attention, but it’s not entirely relevant to the current project. See Price, 
Hume’s Theory of the External World, 15 - 17.  
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 We should keep the following questions in mind: can these passages be explained via the 
four functions of the imagination? If so, then we will have to explain how these problematic 
passages can be explained via Hume’s conception of imagination in Book I, and why these 
passages appear to be problematic.  If they can’t, then we must determine whether Hume is 
extending his conception of imagination to these further applications, or identifying a completely 
different faculty (or function of a different faculty) that just happens to be referred to by the same 
term as the faculty of imagination.  
3.1 Sympathy and Imagination 
 Like his predecessors the 3rd Early of Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, Hume 
maintains a sentimentalist ethics, that is, a moral theory that strictly grounds morality in 
particular types of sentiments rather than any form of rationality. One of the challenges of a 
sentimentalist theory is to provide a non-rationalist method for arriving at such moral sentiments 
and ultimately, moral judgments. Hume’s immediate predecessor, Hutcheson, posited a “moral 
sense,” that is, a distinct sensory faculty that is able to receive the sentiments of others. 
Hutcheson believes that every moral agent possesses a benevolence that is universal in scope, 
and that this benevolence guides our moral sense in approving or disapproving of the actions of 
agents near and remote to us.28 Hume not only rejects Hutcheson’s emphasis on the role of 
benevolence in receiving moral sentiments, but he also denies the existence of a distinct moral 
sense faculty.29 For Hume, moral sense just is moral sentiment that we receive through 
sympathy, “the chief source of moral distinctions.”30 Broadly construed, sympathy is the means 
by which we naturally “communicate” sentiments to each other.31 The imagination plays a 
                                                
28 Wright, Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature An Introduction, 238 – 241. 
29 T 482. 
30 T 618 
31 T 316. 
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central role in this communication of sentiments.32 In what follows, we will examine some key 
passages where Hume describes the role of imagination in sympathy, and see if these passages 
can be explained via the standard interpretation. 
When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those 
external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is 
presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to 
become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection. However 
instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views 
and reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, tho’ they may the person 
himself, who makes them.33 
According to this passage, sympathizing is a two-step process that consists of receiving an idea 
of a sentiment and then converting that idea into the actual sentiment.34    
 The first step is receiving the idea of someone else’s emotional state. This idea can be 
conveyed in a number of ways, but in each case there is a causal inference made by the 
sympathizer to receive this idea; it is by the “relation of cause and effect, by which we are 
convinc’d of the reality of the passion, with which we sympathize.”35 An idea of someone else’s 
emotional state can be conveyed by certain behaviors, that is, behaviors that are effects of the 
person’s emotional state. For example, if I see my little sister crying and bleeding after she 
stubbed her toe, according to Hume, these behaviors can convey an idea of pain to me. However, 
for Hume, sympathy is much broader in scope. We can sympathize with people that we don’t 
immediately observe. If I learn the details of a person’s circumstances in a foreign country, I can 
also make an inference about their sentiments if I was provided with enough information. 
Essentially, in sympathizing we infer based on our past experiences that other people experience 
the same sentiments when they are presented with similar conditions as we are. Thus, since for 
Hume this is a basic causal inference, the scientific function of the imagination is responsible for 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Note that from hereon, I will frequently switch between using ‘sentiment’ and ‘emotional state’. I take these terms 
to be synonymous and will use them interchangeably. 
35 T 320. 
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the first step in sympathizing. 36          
 The second step is converting the idea of someone else’s sentiment into an impression, 
that is, the actual sentiment that the idea represents. To account for this process we must 
understand how Hume distinguishes between ideas and impressions. 
It has been remark’d in the beginning of this treatise, that all ideas are borrow’d from impressions, 
and that these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity, with which 
they strike upon the soul. The component parts of ideas and impressions are precisely alike. The 
manner and order of their appearances may be the same. The different degrees of their force and 
vivacity are, therefore, the only particulars, that distinguish them: And as this difference may be 
remov’d, in some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, ‘tis no wonder an idea 
of a sentiment or passion, may by this means be so inliven’d as to become the very sentiment or 
passion. The lively idea of any object always approaches its impression; and ‘tis certain we may 
feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often 
thinking of it. But this is most remarkable in the opinions and affection; and ‘tis there principally 
that lively idea is converted into an impression. Our affections depend more upon ourselves, and 
the internal operations of the mind, than any other impressions; for which reason they arise more 
naturally from the imagination, and from every lively idea we form of them. This is the nature and 
cause of sympathy; and ‘tis after this manner we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of 
others, whenever we discover them.37 
 
Hume makes the distinction between impressions and ideas based on their respective “force and 
vivacity;” Ideas and impressions are perceptions that “differ only in the degrees of force and 
vivacity, with which they strike upon the soul.” It follows that an idea can become an impression 
if it is enlivened with sufficient force and vivacity, and an impression can become an idea if its 
force and vivacity is sufficiently reduced. Because of certain remarks in Book I,38 some recent 
commentators have rejected the force and vivacity reading of the impression/idea distinction 
because it is not consistent with the text and it creates insurmountable problems for Hume.39 
While I agree with these commentators that the force and vivacity reading is problematic, I think 
                                                
36 There is a lot to object to about the first step in sympathizing. Hume does not provide a convincing account of 
how we can receive a reliable idea of someone else’s sentiments solely through observation of their relevant 
behaviors. If we did have direct access to other people minds, then presumably we would receive ideas of their 
sentiments via the imagistic functions (or even perhaps impressions of their sentiments), but obviously Hume does 
not believe this. Clearly, there is a deep issue in the first step. However, I am going to grant that the standard 
interpretation can account for the first step with the scientific function. 
37 T 318 – 319. 
38 In particular, distinguishing between ideas and impressions merely on force and vivacity seems to violate the copy 
principle. That is, broadly construed, ideas are copies of and derived from impressions. 
39 See Landy, David. "Hume's Impression/Idea Distinction." Hume Studies, 2006: 119 - 139. 
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that it is clear from the above passage that Hume’s account of sympathy cannot get off the 
ground unless Hume distinguishes between impressions and ideas solely on force and vivacity. 
The primary reason for this is Hume’s insistence that sympathy converts40 an idea into an 
impression: “the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they 
represent, and that the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them.”41 For Hume, 
when we sympathize, an idea of someone else’s pain does not cause pain in us, rather, sympathy 
transforms the same mental entity, the idea of someone’s pain, into an impression of pain by 
enlivening it with force and vivacity. Thus, I will be assuming the force and vivacity reading 
because I think it is essential to Hume’s account of sympathy, and I think that it is clear (at least 
in Book II and III) that Hume is drawing the distinction in this way. 
 As emphasized in the above passage, the imagination is responsible for converting ideas 
to impressions. “The lively idea of any object always approaches its impression; and ‘tis certain 
we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by 
often thinking of it,” and “Our affections depend more upon ourselves, and the internal 
operations of the mind, than any other impressions; for which reason they arise more naturally 
from the imagination, and from every lively idea we form of them.”42 According to these 
passages, Hume thinks that the imagination can enliven an idea of a sentiment with such force 
and vivacity that the idea becomes the actual sentiment that the idea originally represented. How 
exactly does the imagination do this? 
3.2 Converting Ideas Into Impressions 
                                                
40 One might be inclined to read this not as a conversion, but as an idea causing a sentiment. However, Hume 
frequently employs the terminology of conversion. For example: “in sympathy there is an evident conversion of an 
idea into an impression” (T 320; emphasis added); “sympathy being the conversion of an idea into an impression…” 
(T 595; emphasis added); and “sympathy, as I have already observ’d, is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an 
impression by the force of imagination” (T 427; emphasis added). 
41 T 319; emphasis added. 
42 T 319. 
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 There are two primary components involved in the process of converting an idea into an 
impression: the impression we have of ourselves, and the principles of resemblance and 
contiguity. Together, these two components convert an idea into an impression.   
 The first component is arguably the most controversial assertion made by Hume in Books 
II and III, that is, the claim that we possess an impression of ourselves that is “always intimately 
present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, 
that ‘tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it.”43 This is 
contentious given Hume’s famous conclusion at the end of Book I that that our idea of a self is 
fallacious and cannot be traced to any single impression, and that it is nothing more than a 
bundle of perceptions.44 Commentators have long struggled with reconciling these two positions. 
While this is an important issue, it’s not completely relevant to the task at hand. What is relevant 
is that Hume (at least in Books II and III) maintains that we do possess such an impression of 
ourselves, and that this impression performs significant philosophical work in the mechanics of 
sympathy.  
 The second component consists of the remaining two principles of association, 
resemblance and contiguity (recall that these principles, along with causation, constitute the 
scientific function of the imagination under the standard interpretation). Hume thinks that 
nothing comes more naturally45 to human beings than sympathizing with others because “nature 
has preserved a great resemblance among all human creatures,”46 and because we naturally have 
affinities with people contiguous to us. Thus, Hume claims, the conversion of an idea into 
                                                
43 T 317. 
44 T 251. 
45 T 320. 
46 T 318; emphasis added. 
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impression results from “the relation of objects to ourself.”47 After the agent has received an idea 
of a person’s sentiment via an inference by the principle of causation, these two principles48 
alone are able to convert the idea into an impression by infusing the idea with force and vivacity, 
which is supplied by the “constant impression of ourselves” that is “always intimately present 
with us.”49 Hume explains: 
 
For besides the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinc’d of the reality of the 
passion, with which we sympathize: besides this, I say, we must be assisted by the relations of 
resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection…these relations can 
entirely convert an idea into an impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter [the impression of 
self] into the former [the respective idea]50 
 
Thus, the stronger these relations of resemblance and contiguity are between an agent an 
a particular person, “the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the 
related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own 
person.”51 
3.3 A New Function? 
Now that we understand the central role of imagination in the mechanics of sympathy, we 
are in a position to determine whether the standard interpretation can account for it. To recap, 
here is a brief formulation of the role of imagination in sympathy: 
First, the imagination, through a causal inference, supplies an agent with an idea about 
someone else’s emotional state, that is, an idea of a sentiment. Second, the imagination 
converts this idea into the actual sentiment that the idea represents by enlivening the idea 
with a sufficient amount of force and vivacity, which is supplied by the agent’s 
impression of her self. The force and vivacity is carried from the impression of the 
agent’s self to the idea by the relations of either resemblance or contiguity. 
 
                                                
47 T 320. 
48 Note that Hume thinks it’s possible for one principle alone to convert an idea into an impression. 
49 T 317. 
50 T 320. 
51 T 318. 
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Which function or functions of the imagination that the standard interpretation identifies are 
responsible for this process? I think that we can immediately rule out the imagistic function, the 
conceptual function, and the metaphysical function. In sympathizing, the imagination is neither 
creating ideas by copying impressions (imagistic), synthesizing ideas (conceptual), nor creating 
ideas that are not linked to any single impression (metaphysical). The scientific function, 
however, deserves closer attention. Recall that the scientific function consists of the principles of 
association (resemblance, contiguity, and causation); these principles provide order and structure 
to our ideas. The scientific function can clearly account for the first step of sympathizing, i.e., 
when the idea of someone else’s emotional state is causally inferred. In the second step, 
however, when the idea is converted into an impression, the scientific function falls short. 
 Hume claims that resemblance and contiguity can carry force and vivacity from an 
impression of a self to a related idea, and enliven it to the point that the idea becomes an 
impression. According to the scientific function, these principles are limited to associating ideas; 
they do not include the ability to operate on impressions, let alone extract force and vivacity 
from them in order to enliven another idea. Thus, the standard interpretation is incomplete, and 
we need to look elsewhere to determine what the imagination is doing in sympathy.  
IV The Transformative Function 
I posed two questions at the beginning of section II about the status of imagination in the 
discussed problematic passages, which we are in a position now to answer. The questions were: 
Is Hume extending his account of imagination to include a special role in sympathy, or is he 
identifying a completely new activity of the mind that just happens to be called ‘imagination’? 
Given how involved the principles of association are in steps one and two in sympathizing and 
Hume’s constant references to imagination, I think it’s clear that the faculty of imagination is 
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involved in sympathy. Thus, our current task is to understand this new application of 
imagination.            
 Recent commentators have picked up on the special role imagination plays in sympathy. 
A few of them, in particular Mark Collier, have regarded it as Hume’s theory moral 
imagination.52 Collier argues that Hume’s insights about imagination and sympathy has relevant 
implications for contemporary theories of moral imagination. However, Collier does not argue 
why Hume’s usage of imagination in ethics qualifies as a distinct theory of moral imagination (as 
we understand such theories today). I find the phrase ‘moral imagination’ misleading if not 
anachronistic, which is why I will not be employing this terminology. Usually, a theory of moral 
imagination concerns the intersection between imaginative creativity and ethical practice (e.g. 
cultivating imaginative powers to better engage moral situations); which is not what Hume is 
concerned with in his account of sympathy. In accordance with the standard interpretation I will 
interpret the role of imagination in the mechanics of sympathy as a function of the faculty 
imagination, that is, as something that the faculty of imagination can do, not as a special moral 
activity.           
 The role of imagination in sympathy alone is sufficient for us to establish a new function 
of the imagination, what I shall refer to as the ‘transformative function’.53 The transformative 
function is the capacity of the imagination to transform or convert an idea into an impression by 
enlivening it with force and vivacity. The primary purpose of the transformative function of the 
imagination is to produce sentiments. As Hume states: “our affections depend more upon 
ourselves, and the internal operations of the mind, than any other impressions; for which reason 
                                                
52 See Collier, Mark. "Hume's Theory of Moral Imagination." History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2010: 255 – 273; 
Hyslop-Margison, Emery J. "Smith, Hume and the Moral Imagination: Sympathy and Social Justice." Pastoral Care 
in Education, 2006: 26 - 30. 
53 Jonathan Harrison also employs the term ‘transformation’ in describing this process. See Harrison, Hume’s Moral 
Epistemology, 106 – 107. 
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they arise more naturally from the imagination,”54        
 The transformative function is related to the scientific function in that both of them are 
undertakings of the principles of association.  The primary difference between the scientific 
function and the transformative function is that the scientific function strictly operates on ideas 
and structures them via all three of the principles, while the transformative function can operate 
on both impressions and ideas to produce other impressions, that is, passions, via resemblance 
and contiguity (not causation). The transformative function operates on an impression when it 
carries the force and vivacity from the impression of the self to a related idea of a sentiment in 
order to convert that idea into the sentiment that the idea represents. Although it’s clear that 
Hume thinks that the principles of association can transfer force and vivacity, it’s not clearly 
exactly how they can do this, and Hume does not appear to provide us with many clues. Other 
commentators have struggled with this as well, Jonathan Harrison’s reaction to this process is: 
“All that I can say is that I find this virtually incomprehensible.”55 I am a bit more optimistic that 
we can construct from these passages an intelligible account of this process, but this is beyond 
the scope of this paper, as my goal was only to show that since the principles of association are 
an inherent aspect of the imagination, the imagination is responsible for converting ideas to 
impressions, and that the standard interpretation is incomplete. 
  Some remarks about how the transformative function stands in relation to the functions 
identified by the standard interpretation are in order. I don’t think that adding the transformative 
function to our list of capacities of the imagination is in any way inconsistent with Hume’s 
                                                
54 T 319. See also: “the imagination is affected by the general rule, and makes us conceive a lively idea of the 
passion, or rather feel the passion itself, in the same manner, as if the person were really actuated by it” (T 371); 
“Thus we have endeavour’d to account for pity and malice. Both these affections arise from the imagination, 
according to the light, in which it places its object (T 381); “’Tis certain, that sympathy is not always limited to the 
present moment, but that we often feel by communication the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being, 
and which we only anticipate by the force of imagination” (T 385); and “’Tis a great effort of imagination, to form 
such lively ideas even of the present sentiments of others as to feel these very sentiments” (T 386). 
55 Harrison, Hume’s Moral Epistemology, 107. 
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account of imagination in Book I. It merely shows that Hume had more in store for the principles 
of association than merely structuring ideas. Moreover, it provides more support for the view that 
the principles of association are a feature of imagination, and are not a feature of the mind 
distinct from the faculty of imagination. Kemp Smith,56 Owen, and Brown also point out that the 
principles of association apply not only to ideas, but to impressions as well.57 However, in the 
case of sympathy, they do not attend to the implications this has for the standard interpretation of 
imagination as merely an idea-forming faculty.  
While this account of imagination may seem complex, I think that it is at least consistent 
with Hume’s approach to the philosophy of human understanding. While Hume likes to ground 
his philosophical theories in simple principles, he is comfortable with providing complex 
explanations.58 As stated in the Introduction to the Treatise, Hume seeks to “to render all our 
principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining 
all effects from the simplest and fewest causes.” The principles of association are a perfect 
exemplification of this, they are a simple feature of the imagination, but they perform a lot of 
work for Hume.  
V Conclusion         
 The standard interpretation is mistaken in limiting the materials of imagination to ideas. 
The transformative function proves that the imagination can also operate on impressions. 
                                                
56 Of the three commentators mentioned, Kemp Smith has the most developed view of the principles of association; 
he acknowledges the association of ideas, and the association of impressions (that is, between passions – this is 
something that the transformative function does not account for, but which does call for attention given my 
approach). Where I differ with Kemp Smith is the status of these principles. In his discussion of sympathy, and the 
association of impressions, it’s not clear whether Kemp Smith thinks that these principles are features of the 
imagination, or just features of the mind. According to the standard interpretation, the principles of association are 
features of the imagination, which only apply to ideas. This is what I am taking issue with, and I am not sure where 
Kemp Smith stands in regards to this. See Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, 169 – 177 and 183 – 187. 
57 See Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, 183 – 187; Owen, “Hume and the Mechanics of Mind: 
Impressions, Ideas, and Association,” 99; and Brown, “Moral Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Sympathy,” 232. 
58 I thank Sam Fleischacker for pointing this out to me. 
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Moreover, the imagination is not only an idea-forming faculty, but it is also a sentiment-forming 
faculty as well. While I think that this new function can be consistently incorporated with the 
four functions of imagination previously discussed; the transformative function raises important 
and interesting periphery issues. I will briefly outline two of these issues that I find striking. 
 The first problem concerns representation. As I have explained it, the transformative 
function converts an idea of a sentiment into the actual sentiment by enlivening it with force and 
vivacity. However, this is in tension with the prominent non-cognitivist reading of Hume’s 
account of the passions. In opposition to ideas Hume claims, “a passion [sentiment] is an original 
existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other 
existence or modification” (T 415).  However, in regards to sympathy, Hume claims “the ideas 
of the affections of others are converted into the very impression they represent, and that the 
passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them.”59 Hume is very adamant about 
developing a non-rationalist ethics, and a lot hinges on the non-cognitivist reading of the 
passions. However, if the sentiments that the transformative function produces are in conformity 
with images of sentiments, is it somehow preserving some of the cognitive content of the ideas 
it’s enlivening? 
 The second problem is related to the first, and it concerns the impression/idea distinction. 
I have already indicated (see section 3.1) that some commentators reject the force and vivacity 
reading of the impression/idea distinction. However, I have maintained that Hume’s account of 
sympathy depends fundamentally on drawing the distinction between ideas and impressions 
solely on force and vivacity. Nevertheless, there is something quite strange (or illuminating) 
about how Hume talks about impressions and ideas in the context of sympathy. Consider again 
the claim that “the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impression they 
                                                
59 T 319. 
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represent, and that the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them.”60 What does 
it mean for a passion to be in conformity with an image? This an interesting issue that deserves 
more attention because I think that it can help us understand other comments Hume makes about 
the sentiments sympathy produces. In particular, remarks that suggest that the sentiments of 
sympathy still are, in a sense, “imaginary,” despite being non-representational. For example:    
when I run over a book with my eye, I imagine I hear it all; and also, by the force of imagination, 
enter into the uneasiness, which the delivery of it wou’d give the speaker. The uneasiness is not 
real; but as such a composition of words has a natural tendency to produce it, this is sufficient to 
affect the mind with a painful sentiment, and render the style harsh and disagreeable.61 
 
This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and 
vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original 
affection.62 
 
 More work needs to be done to clarify the limits and bounds of not only the transformative 
function, but also to better understand the role of imagination more generally in Hume’s moral 
philosophy. However, I think that our discussion here has shown that the imagination is a central 
feature of Hume’s philosophy. Not only is it deeply involved in Hume’s epistemology, 
metaphysics, and philosophy of mind, but also intimately involved in the most important aspect 







                                                
60 T 319; emphasis added. 
61 T 585 – 586; emphasis added. 




Ayer, A.J. Hume. New York: Hill and Wang, 1980. 
Brown, Charlotte R. "Moral Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Sympathy." In A Companion To 
Hume, edited by Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, 219 - 239. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008. 
Collier, Mark. "Hume's Theory of Moral Imagination." History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2010: 
255 - 273. 
Costelloe, Timothy M. "Hume's Phenomenology of the Imagination." The Journal of Scottish 
Philosophy, 2007: 31 - 45. 
Garrett, Don. Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997. 
Harrison, Jonathan. Hume's Moral Epistemology. London: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
Hyslop-Margison, Emery J. "Smith, Hume and the Moral Imagination: Sympathy and Social 
Justice." Pastoral Care in Education, 2006: 26 - 30. 
Landy, David. "Hume's Impression/Idea Distinction." Hume Studies, 2006: 119 - 139. 
Mackie, J.L. Hume's Moral Philosophy. London: Routledge & Keagan Paul Ltd, 1980. 
Owen, David. http://www.ic.arizona.edu/~dwo/. 
—. Hume's Reason. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Pears, David. Hume's System. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Price, Henry H. Hume's Theory Of The External World. Westport: Oxford University Press, 
1981. 
Smith, Norman Kemp. The Philosophy of David Hume. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Streminger, Gerhard. "Hume's Theory of Imagination." Hume Studies, 1980: 91 - 118. 
Traiger, Saul. "Hume on Memory and Imagination." In A Companion to Hume, edited by 
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, 58 - 71. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008. 
Wilbanks, Jan. Hume's Theory of Imagination. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968. 
Wright, John P. Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature An Introduction. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
 
 
